Hume

Fri= day, March 21, 2008

10:= 03 AM

The Rationalism-Empiricism Debate

Epistemological debate- Where does Knowledge come f= rom?
The Definition of Rationalism

belief that there are at least some certain innate ideas (knowledge)
Most are just acquire= d, but the most fundamental ideas are innate

Definition of Empiricism

Denies Rationalism claims.
There is no innate knowledge. There is only experience: "Tabula Rasa".
While there may be in= nate reactions or 'instincts', there is no knowledge.

Rationalism v. Empiricist Tendencies:

Rationalism:

Have a kind of metaphysics.

Empiricist:

Tend not to have a metaphysics.

Disagreements within

Rationalists

Few innate ideas vs. most basic ideas are innate.=

Empiricists

Skeptics (with metaphysics) vs. those with Metaphysics

Hume on Miracles=

The Argument
1. Definition of "miracles"
1. Definition of a wise or reasonable man
1. Conclusion: it is unreasonable to believe in mirac= les

Other related arguments regarding miracles
1. The inconsistency of religious testimony- Which on= e of them is correct?
3. The hidden argument??= ? The pragmatic possibilities.

Hume's irony

"It's a miracle that people believe in miracles".

Hume's epistemology:

Perception:

to Hume: Anything, in the mind, its contents
Two kinds: impression= s and ideas
Principle of differentiation: vivacity and strength

I.E. The impression of the toothach= e hurts more than the idea of a toothache pain.
He does notice that = an idea can strike you almost as strongly as an impression.

Relation between impression and ideas.

Copy Thesis: Ideas are only weaker copies of impressions.
Ideas thesis come fr= om impressions. We cannot ha= ve an idea with and impression.
Meaning thesis: the meaning of an idea is the impressions that it copies.

Kinds of Impressions:

Inner vs. Outer

Inner: Feelings, emotions.
Outer: Sense.

Simple v. Compound

Compound ideas are = formed from combinations of these ideas and impressions.

Association theory-- simple ideas are put together = to form compound ideas. How?

Two impressions may be compounded because they are contiguous in space and time.
Cause and effect: the mind comes to associate a c= ause with its effect.

Hume on reasoning:

	Analytic	Synthetic
A priori
A posterior= i

Analytic	the predica= te is In the subject (a bachelor is an unmarried man). No additional ideas are needed to understand.
Synthetic	the predicate is added to the subject (there are men on the moon). Y= ou have to go and find out.
A priori	Known witho= ut any additional experience.
A posterior= i	Need further experience to understand

Hume rejects:

Analytic X A posterior= i, without saying there are innate ideas- if it's Analytic, it must be a priori.
Synethetic X a priori statements. If it's synthet= ic, Hume says it must be a posteriori.
(Descartes would disag= ree with both of these assertions. "I think therefore I am" and "I am a thinking thing" would be his examples of Synthetic/A Priori)

Hume regarding necessary connection (causality)

The problem- We don't have predicate in the subject. How could natural necessity be in of causal law and science? How can you have the idea of = causal statements in synthetic statements?
The solution- He simply eliminates two of the= kinds of statements as he does in the table above. Another way of stating the diff= erence between empiricists and rationalists. In other words- Hume thinks you cannot reason from cause to effect or vice versa, although numerous philosophers have claimed to= do so.
(By the way, here's t= he definition of a causal statement): A causal statement taken as scientific law refers to a necessary connection: a causes b would me= an "if a happens, then b must occur. The problem is that this idea of natural necessity, these cau= sal laws, are synthetic. How d= oes this work in Hume?
There is no impressio= n of necessary connection around yet. He has it so that people begin to associate one with the other because they are constantly conjoined (one always happens with the other).
His take on causality= is that it is a psychological or subjective phenomenon. This becomes a 'custom' to believe. You are condition= ed to expect things to happen because they've happened as such so far.
IN SHORT: HE THINKS T= HAT CAUSALITY IS NOT OBJECTIVE, BUT A SUBJECTIVE THING.

He more or less throws out theological statements = and metaphysics.
Throws out any philosophical Cartesian id= ea of self or substance.
Says that the idea of= self doesn't exist and that the idea of God means nothing. You don't have that idea. Basically says its useless to t= ry to know these things.

Criticism

Problem of the missing color:

Hume's atomism; red v. "wooly red". Which is the stronger, more viva= cious experience. We get the expe= rience, and it isn't just a collection of simple ideas. You have to separate the experie= nce before you get the smallest bits.
Impossibility of locat= ing a single impression. The prob= lem with the 'same' impression, e.g. the note "C".
Immediate experience t= hat is not "having impressions." Searchig for a word or phrase. Also, transitive states of expierience.
Judgment as efficaciou= s in immediate experience. "= ;Seeing as."

Paranoia- The whole world seems like they're again= st you.
You're happy. The whole world looks bright.
You project your thou= ghts onto your current experience.

Problem of metaphorical language with respect to association:

'That's cool.' 'She's hot'. 'Chill= !' 'I'm blue'. 'He's really up today.' With Hume's epistemology, these phrases would be meaningless.
Also: context.=

Problems regarding Hume's analysis of the self: For Hume, there is no impression of the self. So there is no such idea of self for Hume. Yet we use the personal pronoun = 'I' with meaning. How??? Hume also says the self is merel= y a (momentary) bundle of impressions. But this would imply that myself today is not the same as myse= lf yesterday. And this would m= ake it difficult if not impossible to make my self responsible today for wha= t I did yesterday. But I am responsible for what I did yesterday, are I not?
Problem of self-refere= ntial consistency:

Consider: "All (meaningful) statements are either analytic and a priori or synthetic and a posteriori." What sort of statement is that?= It is not the former, it is not= the latter. Therefore it is meaningless by its own criteria. It rules itself out. Not good.
Consider "All (meaningful) ideas are copies of impressions(s)." The sentence above contains the= idea of an idea. What impressio= ns could the idea of an idea copy? None. Again, a stat= ement which is not consistent with the criterion it sets out.

Conclusions: